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We present a natural deduction proof system for the propositional
modal +-calculus and its formalization in the calculus of inductive
constructions. We address several problematic issues, such as the use of
higher-order abstract syntax in inductive sets in the presence of recursive
constructors, and the formalization of modal (sequent-style) rules and of
context sensitive grammars. The formalization can be used in the system
Coq, providing an experimental computer-aided proof environment for
the interactive development of error-free proofs in the modal +-calculus.
The techniques we adopt can be readily ported to other languages and
proof systems featuring similar problematic issues. ] 2001 Academic Press
Key Words: +-calculus; modal and temporal logics; type theory; formal
methods.
INTRODUCTION
We present a natural deduction proof system for Kozen’s propositional modal
+-calculus and its formalization in the calculus of inductive constructions.
The modal +-calculus, often referred to as +K, is a temporal logic which sub-
sumes many modal and temporal logics, such as PDL, CTL, CTL*, and ECTL.
Despite its expressive power, +K enjoys nice properties such as the finite model
property and decidability. Therefore, the modal +-calculus is an ideal candidate as
a logic for the verification of processes. Although Walukiewicz [31] proved the
completeness of Kozen’s original system [17], its applicability to nontrivial cases
is limited by long, difficult, error-prone proofs. Moreover, the problem of validity
of a formula is EXPTIME-complete; hence, a fully-automatized theorem prover for
+K may be computationally very expensive.
These drawbacks can be (partially) overcome by supplying the user with a
computer-aided proof environment, that is, a system in which the user can represent
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(encode, formalize) the formal system, more or less abstractly: its syntax, axioms,
rules, and inference mechanisms. After having supplied the proof environment with
a representation of the formal system, the user should be able to correctly
manipulate (the representations of) the proofs.
However, the implementation of a proof environment for a specific formal system
is a complex, time-consuming, and daunting task. The environment should provide
tools for checking previously handmade proofs; developing interactively, step-by-
step, error-free proofs from scratch; reusing previously proved properties; and even
deriving properties automatically, when feasible, freeing the user from most of the
unpleasant and error-prone steps.
An alternative and promising solution is to develop a general theory of logical
systems, that is, a logical framework. A logical framework is a metalogical
formalism for the specification of both the syntactic and the deductive notions of a
wide range of formal systems. Logical frameworks provide suitable means for
representing and deal with, in the metalogical formalism, the proofs and derivations
of the object system. Much of the implementation effort can be expended once and
for all; hence, the implementation of a logical framework yields a logic-independent
proof development environment. Such an environment is able to check the validity of
deductions in any formal system, after it has been provided by the specification of
the system in the formalism of the logical framework.
Several different frameworks have been proposed, implemented, and applied to
many formal systems. Type theories have emerged as leading candidates for logical
frameworks. Simple typed *-calculus and minimal intuitionistic propositional logic
are connected by the well-known proposition-as-types paradigm [6]. Stronger type
theories, such as the Edinburgh logical framework, the calculus of inductive construc-
tions and MartinLo f ’s type theory, were especially designed, or can be fruitfully
used, as a logical framework [2, 5, 13, 23]. In these frameworks, we can represent
faithfully and uniformly all the relevant concepts of the inference process in a
logical system: syntactic categories, terms, assertions, axiom schemata, rule
schemata, tactics, etc., via the judgements-as-types, proofs-as-*-terms paradigm
[13]. The key concept is that of hypothetico-general judgement [20], which is
rendered as a type of the dependent typed *-calculus of the logical framework. With
this interpretation, a judgement is viewed as a type whose inhabitants correspond
to proofs of the judgement.
It is worthwhile noticing that logical frameworks based on type theory directly
give rise to proof systems in the natural deduction style in the sense of [1, 12]. This
follows from the fact that the typing systems of the underlying *-calculi are in the
natural deduction style, and rules and proofs are represented by *-terms. As it is
well known, natural deduction-style systems are more suited to practical usage,
since they allow for developing proofs the way mathematicians normally reason.
These type theories have been implemented in logic-independent systems such as
Coq, LEGO, and ALF [5, 18, 19]. These systems can be readily turned into inter-
active proof development environments for a specific logic: we need only to provide
the specification of the formal system (the signature), i.e., a declaration of typed
constants corresponding to the syntactic categories, term constructors, judgements,
and rule schemata of the logic. It is possible to prove, informally but rigorously,
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that a formal system is adequately represented by its specification. This proof
usually exhibits bijective maps between objects of the formal system (terms,
formul$, proofs) and the corresponding *-terms of the formalization.
This paper is part of an ongoing research programme at the Computer Science
Department of the University of Udine on proof editors, started in 1992, based on
HOAS encodings in dependent typed *-calculus for program logics [15, 16, 21]. In
this paper, we investigate the applicability of this approach to the modal +-calculus.
Due to its expressive power, we adopt the calculus of inductive constructions
(CIC), implemented in the system Coq. Beside its importance in the theory and
verification of processes, the modal +-calculus is interesting also for its syntactic
and proof theoretic peculiarities. These idiosyncrasies are mainly due to (a) the
negative arity of ‘‘+’’ (i.e., the bound variable x ranges over the same syntactic class
of +x.); (b) a context-sensitive grammar due the condition on +x.; (c) rules with
complex side conditions (sequent-style ‘‘proof ’’ rules). These anomalies escape the
standard representation paradigm of CIC; hence, we need to accommodate special
techniques for enforcing these peculiarities. Moreover, since generated editors allow
the user to reason ‘‘under assumptions,’’ the designer of a proof editor for a given
logic is urged to look for a natural deduction formulation of the system. Hence, we
introduce a new proof system N \+K in natural deduction style for +K. This system
should be more natural to use than traditional Hilbert-style systems; moreover, it
takes best advantage of the possibility of manipulating assumptions offered by CIC
in order to implement the problematic substitution of formul$ for variables. In fact,
substitutions are delayed as much as possible and are kept in the derivation context
by means of assumptions. This mechanism fits perfectly the stack discipline of
assumptions of natural deduction, and it is neatly formalized in CIC.
Besides these practical and theoretical motivations, this work can give insights in
the expressive power of CIC and Coq. Indeed, the formalization techniques we will
adopt take full advantage of pragmatic features offered by Coq, such as the
automatic simplification of terms, in order to simplify as much as possible the task
of proof development. Moreover, it is interesting to notice how in the formalization
process, the need for an easy-to-use system leads us to some theoretical considera-
tions on N \+K itself.
Synopsis. In Section 1, we recall the syntax and the semantics of +K. In Section
2 we present a proof system which captures the syntactic condition on the forma-
tion of +x.. The proof system N \+K is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 gives a brief
insight into the CIC. In Section 5 we discuss the formalization of +K in CIC and
some theoretical issues on N \+K which have arisen by the formalization itself. Final
comments and suggestions for future work are reported in Section 6. Longer listings
of Coq code are reported in Appendix.
1. SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF THE MODAL +-CALCULUS
The language of +K is an extension of the syntax of propositional dynamic
logic. Let Act be a set of actions (ranged over by a, b, c), and Var a set of
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propositional variables (ranged over by x, y, z); the syntax of the modal +-calculus
on Act is
8 : .,  ::= ff | c. | .# | [a] . | x | +x.,
where the formation of +x. is subject to the positivity condition: every occurrence
of x in . has to appear inside an even number of negations. (In the following we
will spell out this condition more in detail.) We call preformuls the language
obtained by dropping the positivity condition. The variable x is bound in +x.; the
usual conventions about :-equivalence apply. Given a set XVar of variables, we
denote by 8X =
def [. # 8 | FV(.)X ] the set of formul$ with free variables in X.
Capture-avoiding substitutions are the usual maps 8  8, written as lists of the
form [.1 x1 , ..., .n xn]; they are ranged over by _, {. We denote by ._ the formula
obtained by applying the substitution _ to ..
The interpretation of modal +-calculus comes from modal logic. A model for the
modal +-calculus is a transition system, that is, a pair M=(S,  }) where S is a
(generic) nonempty set of (abstract) states, ranged over by s, t, r, and  } is the
interpretation of command symbols: for all a, we have a: S  P(S ).
Formul$ of modal +-calculus may have free propositional variables; therefore, we
need to introduce environments, which are functions assigning sets of states to
propositional variables: Env =def Var  P(S ). Given a model M=(S,  }) and an
environment \, the semantics of a formula is the set of states in which it holds,
defined compositionally:
 ff  \ =def < .# \ =def (S". \) _  \
x \ =def \(x) [a]. \ =def [s # S | a s. \]
c. \ =def S". \ +x. \ =def , [TS | . \[x [ T]T].
The intuitive meaning of [a] . is that ‘‘. holds in every state we reach after the
execution of a.’’ It is customary to view a formula . with a free variable x as defin-
ing a function . \x : P(S )  P(S ), such that for all US : .
\
x(U )=. \[x [ U ].
The intuitive interpretation of +x. is then the least fixed point (l.f.p.) of . \x . The
syntactic condition on the formation of +x. ensures the monotonicity of . \x , and
hence, by KnasterTarski’s theorem, the existence of the l.f.p. as well [17]. This
does not hold if we drop the condition on the formation of +x.; e.g., the formula
cx identifies the function (cx) \x (T )=S"T, which is not monotone and has no
(least) fixed point.
2. A PROOF SYSTEM FOR THE POSITIVITY CONDITION
Since we aim at encoding the modal +-calculus in some logical framework, we
need to enforce the context-sensitive condition on the formation of formul$ of the
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FIG. 1. The positivity proof system.
form +x.. That is, we ought to specify in detail the condition of ‘‘occurring positive
in a formula’’ for a variable. This notion can be represented by two new judgements
on formul$ and variables, posin and negin, which are derived by means of the rules
in Fig. 1. Roughly, posin(x, .) holds iff all occurrences of x in . are positive; dually,
negin(x, .) holds iff all occurrences of x in . are negative. Notice that if x does not
occur in ., then it occurs both positively and negatively. More formally, the
notions these auxiliary judgements refer to are the following:
Definition 2.1 [(Anti)Monotonicity]. For . # 8, x # Var, we say that
1. . is monotone on x (written Monx(.)) if and only if \M, \\, \U,
VS: UV O . \x(U ).
\
x(V );
2. . is antimonotone on x (written AntiMonx(.)) if and only if \M, \\, \U,
VS: UV O . \x(U )$. \x(V ).
These notions refer directly to the semantic structures in which formul$ take
meaning. In fact, the syntactic conditions of positivity and negativity are sound
with respect to the semantic condition of monotonicity and antimonotonicity,
respectively:
Proposition 2.1. For all . formula and x variable: |&posin(x, .) O Monx(.)
and |&negin(x, .) O AntiMonx(.).
The converse of Proposition 2.1 does not hold. Consider, e.g., . =def (x#x):
clearly, . \=S always, and hence (x#x) \x is both monotone and antimonotone.
However, x does not occur only positively or only negatively in .. Hence, we can-
not derive |&posin(x, (x#x)) or |&negin(x, (x#x)). This result can be generalized
as follows:
Proposition 2.2. If x # FV(.) occurs both positively and negatively in . then
neither posin(x, .) nor negin(x, .) are derivable.
Proof. By induction on the syntax of .. K
However, we can restrict ourselves to only positive formul$ without loss of
generality: by the Lyndon Theorem [7], every monotone formula is equivalent to
a positive one.
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3. THE PROOF SYSTEM N \+K
Usually, systems for modal +-calculus are given in Hilbert style [17, 27]. In this
section we present N \+K , a lazy substitution proof system in natural deduction style
for +K. As we will see in Section 5, in order to deal with the negative constructor
‘‘+’’ we have to change the standard encoding paradigm of logical frameworks. As
a consequence, we can no longer delegate substitution to the machinery of the logi-
cal framework; hence, it has to be implemented manually, at some extent. The
system we present in this section aims at minimizing these explicit substitutions by
taking full advantage of the possibility of reasoning under assumptions. This system
is called lazy after the fact that substitutions of formul$ for variables are delayed
as much as possibleand may not be performed at all.
N \+K is composed by two derivation systems, the logical one and the expansion
one (Fig. 2). Roughly, the logical system allows for deriving formul$ from formul$
(assumptions) and bindings, which are judgements of the form x [ ., where x # Var
and . # 8. The expansion system allows for deriving judgements of the form . \ 
(reads ‘‘. expands to ,’’ or ‘‘ is an expansion of .’’) from a list of bindings.
Definition 3.1. A set of assumptions (denoted by 1 ) is any finite set of
formul$; a binding list (denoted by 2) is a list (x1 [ .1 , ..., xn [ .n) such that for
all i{ j: xi {xj , and for all i j: xj  FV(.i).
A derivation of . from assumptions 1 and bindings 2 is denoted by 2; 1 |&.;
a derivation of . \  from 2 is denoted by 2|&. \ .
FIG. 2. The natural deduction-style proof system N \+K for modal +-calculus: logical system (top) and
expansion system (bottom).
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The logical system is composed by a standard set of rules for classical proposi-
tional logic, extended by Scott’s rule Sc for minimal modal logic, the rules \-R
and \-L, and the introelimination rules +-I and +-E.
Rules \-R and \-L state that a formula is logically equivalent to any of its
expansions. In a sequent-style formulation such as the following, these rules can be
seen as the ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘left’’ expansions, respectivelyhence the names:
\ &R
2; 1 |&.
2; 1 |&
. \  \ &L
2; 1, . |&!
2; 1,  |&!
. \ .
The rules for + have a direct semantic interpretation: the introduction rule states
that (the meaning of) +x. is a prefixed point of . \x ; the elimination rule states that
(the meaning of) +x. implies, and then ‘‘is less than,’’ any prefixed point of . \x .
Therefore, these rules state that (the meaning of) +x. is the minimum prefixed
point, i.e., the least fixed point, of . \x .
In rule Sc, the square brackets surrounding 1 mean that  may depend only on
the discharged assumption in 1. Similarly, in rule +-E, the formula .[zx] is the
only assumption that the subderivation of  may depend on. These ‘‘modal’’ side
conditions can be explicated clearly by a sequent-style presentation:
Sc
2; 1 |&
2; [a] 1 |&[a] 
+-E
2; 1 |&+x. 2, z [ ; .[zx] |&
2; 1 |&
z fresh.
No logical rule requires a binding as a premise; bindings are only discharged in
rules requiring a substitution (i.e., rules +-I and +-E). In these rules, variables are
not textually replaced by the corresponding formula, but only by an :-equivalent
(‘‘fresh’’) variable. The discharged hypothesis keeps in the derivation context the
binding between the substituted variable and the corresponding formula. These
hypotheses form a binding list which is used by the expansion system: roughly, we
can prove 2 |&. \  iff . and  are the same formula, ‘‘up to 2’’. This is made
precise by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Let 2 be a binding list; then the relation R=[(., ) | 2 |&
. \ ] is the smallest precongruence which contains 2.
Proof. Clearly, R is reflexive and compositional on the syntax of formul$. For
all x [ . # 2, it is R(x, .) because of the ‘‘variable replacement rule’’
x [ . . \ .
x \ .
.
It remains to prove that R is transitive. More precisely, we prove that given two
derivations 61 : 1 |&. \  and 62 : 1 |& \ !, we can build a derivation
6: 1 |&. \ !. The proof is by induction on the depth of 61 and 62 .
Base case: let 61 (respectively, 62) be an application of the reflexivity rule.
Then .= (respectively, =!); hence 6=62 (respectively, 6=61).
Inductive case: by cases on the last rule applied in 61 .
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If it is a congruence rule, say the one for negation, then .=c.1 , =c1 for
some .1 , 1 , and there is a subderivation 611 : 2 |&.1 \ 1 . By inspection, 62
must also end with the same congruence rule; hence !=c!1 for some !1 and there
is a subderivation 621 : 2 |&1 \ !1 . By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a
derivation 6$ : 2 |&.1 \ !1 , and then by applying the congruence rule for nega-
tion, we obtain 6 : 2 |&c.1 \ c!1 .
Otherwise, the last rule applied is
x [ .1 .1 \ 
x \ 
,
for some x and subderivation 611 : 2 |&.1 \ . By inductive hypothesis there
exists 6$ : 2 |&.1 \ !, and then by applying the above mentioned rule, we obtain
the thesis. K
Before proving soundness and completeness of N \+K , we need some technical
definitions and results.
Definition 3.2. Let M=(S,  }) be a model for +K, and let 2 be a binding
list. An environment \ in M agrees with 2 (written \<2) if for all bindings x [ .
in 2 : \(x)=. \.
For any environment \, we denote by \2 the environment defined as follows:
\( ) =
def \ \2, x [ . =
def \2[x [ . \2].
The agreement operation ( } )2 enjoys the following property:
Proposition 3.2. For all environments \ and for all binding lists 2:
1. \2<2;
2. if \<2 then \2=\;
3. ( } )2 is idempotent, that is (\2)2=\2 .
Proof. Points (1) and (2) are trivially proved by induction on the length of 2.
Point (3) follows from (1) and (2). K
The following result can be seen as our counterpart of the classical substitution
lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (Expansion Lemma). For 2 a binding list and . a formula, there
exists a formula .2 such that 2 |&. \ 2 and for all M, and \ an environment in
M : . \2=.2 \.
Proof. Let us define .< =
def . and .2, x [  =
def
(.[x])2 . Clearly, FV(.2) &
dom(2)=< by the definition of a binding list. The derivation 2 |&. \ .2 can be
built by induction on the syntax of . and on the length of 2: we apply the suitable
structural rule until we reach a variable x such that there is a binding (x [ ) # 2.
In this case, we have to prove that 2 |&x \ x2 , i.e., 2 |&x \ 2 . In fact, 2 can
be decomposed in 2$, x [ , 2", and FV() & dom(2)=FV() & dom(2$) by the
definition of a binding list. Therefore, by inductive hypothesis there is a derivation
2$ |& \ 2$ , which is also 2 |& \ 2 because FV() & dom(2")=<. Hence,
2 |&x \ 2 by applying the rule
x [   \ 2
x \ 2
.
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It remains to prove that \M, \\ . . \2=.2 \, by induction on the length of
2. The base case is trivial. Suppose that it holds for 2; we prove it for 2, x [ .
If x  FV(.), it is immediate. Otherwise,
.2, x [   \=(.[x])2 \ by definition of ( } )2
=.[x] \2 by inductive hypothesis
=. \2[x [  \2] classical substitution lemma
=. \2, x [  by definition of \2, x [  .
In order to have a semantical counterpart of the syntactic notion of deduction,
we introduce a suitable notion of consequence for the modal +-calculus:
Definition 3.3. Let 1 be a finite set of formul$, 2 a binding list, and . a
formula. We say that
1. . is a consequence of 1 under 2 with respect to M (written 2; 1 <M .) iff
for all \ which agrees with 2 : 1 \. \ (where 1 \ =def . # 1 . \);
2. . is a consequence of 1 under 2 (written 2; 1 <.) iff for all models M:
2; 1 <M \;
3. . is a consequence of 1 (written 1 <.) iff <; 1 <\.
We finally come to the soundness and completeness of the N \+K system:
Theorem 3.7. For all 2, 1, and .: 2; 1 |&.  2; 1 <..
Proof. Soundness ( O ) is proved by showing that each rule is sound. We show
the most complex case, namely +-E, the others being similar.
Let 2, z [ .; .[zx]<, where z does not appear in 2, ., ; we have to prove
2; +x. < . This is equivalent to prove that +x. \ \ for any model M
and environment \ which agrees with 2. By definition of +x., it is sufficient to
prove that  \ is a prefixed point of . \x , as follows:
. \x( \)=. \[x [  \] by definition of . \x
=.[zx] \[z [  \] for z fresh
=.[zx] \z [  by definition of \z  
 \z [  because \z [ <2, z [  by
Proposition 3.2, and by hypothesis
= \ since z  FV().
Completeness ( o ) can be proved as follows. Since 1 is finite, let 1 be
[.1 , ..., .n]. Then 2; 1 <. iff 2; <<1#., where ‘‘1#.’’ is a shorthand for
.1 # } } } #.n #.. This means that
\M=(S,  }), \\: \<2 O 1#. \=S
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which, by Proposition 3.2, is equivalent to \M=(S,  }) , \\ : 1#. \2=S. By
Lemma 3.1, there exists a formula  such that 2 |&(1#.) \  and \M=
(S,  }) , \\ :  \=S. This latter fact amounts to the validity of , and hence,
by completeness of Hilbert-style axiomatization [31], there is a Hilbert-style
derivation of . In order to prove the completeness of N \+K , therefore, it is sufficient
to prove that all theorems provable by a Hilbert-style system are theorems of N \+K ;
that is, they are derivable without using any assumptions or bindings. In fact, if 6
is a proof of <; < |& in N \+K , then the following is a proof of 2; 1 |&.:
<
6

2
b
(1#.) \ 
\-L
1#. 1
6$
.
where the subderivation 6$: 1, (1#.) |&. is made of n applications of #-E.
In order to prove that theorems of Kozen’s system are theorems of N \+K , it is suf-
ficient to prove that Kozen’s axioms and rules (e.g., those in [27]) are derivable.
We see only the case of axiom .[+x.x]#+x.:
(z [ +x.)2
(.[+x.x])1 (.[zx])3
6
.[zx] \ .[+x.x]
\-L
.[zx]
(3)
+-I
+x.
(2)
#-I
.[+x.x]#+x.
(1)
where the subderivation 6: z [ +x. |&.[zx] \ .[+x.x] is easily built by
induction on the syntax of .. K
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.1, we recover the customary form of the
adequacy of N \+K :
Corollary 3.1. For all 1 finite and . formula: <; 1 |&.  1 <..
As a final note on the proof system N \+K , we point out that we could consider
a strict expansion d, in place of \. The judgement ‘‘. d ’’ would mean ‘‘.
expands to  by applying at least one variable replacement;’’ hence, . and  would
always be different. However, although we could drop the reflexivity rule. we should
add the following three rules:
x [ .
x d .
.1 d .2
(.1 #) d (.2 #)
1 d 2
(.#1) d (.#2)
.
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Hence, we have adopted the relation whose axiomatization involves the minor
number of rules.
4. THE CALCULUS OF INDUCTIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section we give a brief introduction to the CIC. For more details about
CIC and logical frameworks, we refer the interested reader to [5, 13, 24, 25].
The calculus of inductive constructions is an extension of Coquand and Huet’s
calculus of constructions (CC ), which can be defined as the PTS *C of Barendregt’s
*-cube, with two sorts, Prop and Set. Under the proposition-as-types,
proofs-as-terms paradigm, there is an isomorphism between propositions of intui-
tionistic higher-order logic and types of sort Prop. If A has type Prop then it
represents a logical proposition; the fact that A is inhabited by a term M represents
the fact that A holds. Each term M inhabiting A represents a proof of A. On the
other hand, the sort Set is supposed to be the type of datatypes, such as naturals,
lists, trees, and Booleans. These types differ from those inhabiting Prop for their
constructive contents.
Like any system extending the second-order PTS *2 (Girard’s system F ), CC
allows us to define inductive types by means of higher-order (impredicative)
quantifications, but these representations are not always satisfactory (see [24] for
a discussion). An alternative way for representing inductive types has been introduced
in the calculus of inductive constructions by T. Coquand and C. Paulin-Mohring and
implemented in the Coq system [5, 24]. The idea is to extend the language of typed
*-terms by adding some special constants which represent the definition, introduc-
tion, and elimination of inductive types. For instance, the following definition of
natural numbers
Inductive nat : Set :=O : nat | S : nat &> nat
allows us to define terms by case analysis, such as the following function:
Definition pred := [n:nat]Cases n of O => O
| (S u) => u end.
Using these elimination schemata, Coq automatically states and proves the induc-
tion principle for each inductively defined type. For instance, the above definition
yields the Peano induction principle ‘‘for free’’:
natind : (P:nat&>Prop)(P O) &>
((n:nat)(P n)&>(P (S n))) &> (n:nat)(P n)
This feature has been extensively used in the definition of logical connectives: we
need only to specify the introduction rules, and we can prove the elimination rules
from the elimination principle the system automatically provides us.
However, allowing for any inductive definition in CIC would yield nonnormaliz-
ing terms, thus invalidating the standard proof of consistency of the system. Hence,
inductive definitions are subject to the positivity condition, which (roughly) requires
that the type we are defining does not occur in a negative position in the type of
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any constructor. This condition ensures the soundness of the system, but it also rules
out many sound inductive definitions. For instance, the following definition of *-terms
Inductive L : Set := Lam : (L&>L) &> L | App : L &> L &> L.
is not well-formed, due to the negative occurrence of L in the type of Lam. This
kind of representation is called higher-order abstract syntax, because one of the
constructors takes a higher-order term (i.e., a function) as an argument. The
problem of combining higher-order abstract syntax with inductive definitions is a
very active area of work; for further details, we refer to [811, 14, 16].
This problem may arise also at the propositional level, in particular when
predicates are defined by natural deduction rules with discharged assumptions. For
instance, the following elementary definition of minimal propositional logic
Inductive T : o &> Prop :=
ImpI : (A,B:o)((T A)&>(T B)) &> (T (Imp A B))
| ImpE : (A,B:o)(T (Imp A B)) &> (T A) &> (T B).
is not wellformed in CIC. In this case, we can stick to the classical LF paradigm
[13], i.e., we can represent the type and its constructors by means of constants of
the right type. Thus, the minimal propositional logic can be encoded as follows:
Parameter T : o &> Prop.
Axiom ImpI : (A,B:o)((T A)&>(T B)) &>(T (Imp A B)).
Axiom ImpE : (A,B:o)(T (Imp A B)) &> (T A) &> (T B).
Of course, defining a predicate by means of Axioms does not give rise automati-
cally to any induction principle; hence, we need to introduce all elimination rules
explicitly. The induction principle over the type of proofs may be useful if we aim
at proving metatheoretical results, such as cut-elimination of the proof system; it is
not needed for doing proofs in the system, provided that we provide the right
elimination rules. Usually this is not a problem for proof systems in natural deduc-
tion style, since they specify both introduction and elimination rules for each
propositional constructor. Moreover, if the formalization is faithful, then its sound-
ness and completeness correspond to the soundness and completeness of the proof
system on paper, by the isomorphism between types and proposition. Hence, given
a sound and complete proof system (such as N \+K), its formalizations are sound and
complete if and only if they are faithful.
Another problem arising from the use of higher-order abstract syntax together with
inductive types is that of exotic terms. These are *-terms which do not correspond to
any object on paper, despite the fact that their types correspond to some syntactic
category. Exotic terms are generated when a type has a higher-order constructor over
an inductive type. A simple example is the following fragment of first-order logic:
Inductive i : Set := zero : i | one : i.
Inductive o : Set := ff : o | eq : i &> i &> o | forall : (i&>o)&>o.
Definition weird : o := (forall [x:i](Cases x of
zero => ff
| one => (eq zero zero)
end)).
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The term weird does not correspond to any proposition of first order logic: there
is no formula \x. such that .[0x] and .[1x] are syntactically equal to ‘‘ff ’’ and
‘‘0=0,’’ respectively.
Exotic terms are problematic in establishing the faithfulness of the formalization;
usually, they have to be ruled out by means of auxiliary ‘‘validity’’ judgements.
Another approach (which will be used in Section 5.1) is to have the higher order
constructors to range over types which are not defined as inductive, so that there
are no Cases to use as above. See [8, 14] and [21, Section 11.2] for further
details.
5. THE FORMALIZATION OF MODAL +-CALCULUS
In this section we present the formalization of the modal +-calculus in the
calculus of inductive constructions. We will then present the formalization of both
the language and the proof system N \+K given in Section 3. For the complete
vernacular code, see the Appendix.
5.1. Formalizing the Language
The formalization of the language of modal +-calculus is quite elaborate. The
customary approach is to define an inductive type, o:Set, whose constructors
correspond to those of the language of +K. In order to take full advantage of :-con-
version and substitution machinery provided by the metalanguage, we adopt the
higher order abstract syntax [8, 13]. In this approach, binding constructors (such
as +) are rendered by higher-order term constructors; that is, they take a function.
The na@ ve representation of + would be mu:(o&>o)&>o, but this solution does not
work inside an inductive definition of CIC (see Section 4).
The second problem is the presence of a context-sensitive condition on the
applicability of +: in order to construct a formula of the form +x., we have to make
sure that x occurs positively in .. Inductive types do not support this kind of
restriction, since they define only context-free languages [21].
In order to overcome the first problems, we adopt the bookkeeping technique
[21]. We introduce a separate type, var, for the identifiers. The ro^le played by
variables is that of placeholders for formul$: they will be bound to formul$ in the
application of +-I and +-E rules, by means of an auxiliary judgement.
Parameter var : Set.
Axiom varnat : (Ex [srj:var&>nat](n:nat)(Ex [x:var](srj x)=n)).
Notice that we do not define var as an inductive set. Indeed, the definition of the
syntax of +-calculus does not require the set of variables to be inductive (Section
1 and [17, 31]). Hence, we do not committ ourselves with unnecessary (and not
harmless) assumptions; we only assume that there are infinitely many variables, by
means of the varnat axiom.
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Then, we define the set of preformul$ of modal +-calculus and also those not well
formed:
Parameter Act : Set.
Inductive o : Set := ff : o
| Not : o &> o
| Imp : o &> o &> o
| Box : Act &> o &> o
| Var : var &> o
| mu : (var&>o) &> o.
Notice that the argument of mu is a function of type var&>o. This cannot give rise
to exotic terms, since var is not declared as an inductive set.2 Of course, the price
we pay is that equality between variables is not decidable.
Now, we have to rule out all the non-well-formed formul$. At the moment,
the only way to enforce in CIC context-sensitive conditions over languages is to
define a subtype by means of 7-types. As a first step, we formalize the system for
positivity ornegativity presented in Fig. 1, introducing the two judgements posin
and negin of type var&>o&>Prop. A careful analysis of the proof system (Fig. 1)
points out that the derivation of these judgements is completely syntax driven. It is
therefore natural to define these judgements as recursively defined functions, instead
of inductively defined propositions. This is indeed possible, but the rules for
the binding operators introduce an implicit quantification over the set of variables
different from the one we are looking for. This quantification is rendered by
assuming a locally new variable (y) and that it is different from the variable x (see
last cases):
Fixpoint posin [x:var;A:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases A of
ff => True
| (Not B) => (negin x B)
| (Imp A1 A2) => (negin x A1)"(posin x A2)
| (Box a B) => (posin x B)
| (Var y) => True
| (mu F) => (y:var) t(x=y)&>(posin x (F y))
end
with negin [x:var;A:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases A of
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2 One could object that if we ‘‘instantiate’’ var on an inductive set, e.g., nat, we can effectively build
exotic terms. The point is that one should be aware that such instantiation would automatically add a
whole bunch of extra assumptions (induction and recursion principles, reduction rules, etc.) to the
encoding. Clearly, adding arbitrary assumptions to a given theory may lead to inconsistencies; hence, it
is not surprising if we get troubles in instantiating var to a specific inductive set. In fact, the definition
of the syntax of +-calculus does not require var to be inductive, so we can consistently leave it as an
‘‘open’’ (i.e., noninductive) set.
ff => True
| (Not B) => (posin x B)
| (Imp A1 A2) => (posin x A1)"(negin x A2)
| (Box a B) => (negin x B)
| (Var y) => t(x=y)
| (mu F) => (y:var) t(x=y)&>(negin x (F y))
end.
Therefore, in general a goal (posin x A) can be Simplified (i.e., by applying the
Simpl tactic, in Coq) to a conjunction of only three forms of propositions: True,
negations of equalities, or implications from negations of equalities to another
conjunction of the same form. These three forms are dealt with simply in Coq;
hence proving this kind of goal is a simple and straightforward task.
Similarly, a preformula is well formed when every application of + satisfies the
positivity condition:
Fixpoint iswf [A:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases A of
ff => True
| (Not B) => (iswf B)
| (Imp A1 A2) => (iswf A1)"(iswf A2)
| (Box a B) => (iswf B)
| (Var y) => True
| (mu F) => (x:var)(iswf (F x))"
((notin x (mu F)) &> (posin x (F x)))
end.
In the case of +, we locally assume the fact that the x we introduce does not appear
in the formula, i.e., it is fresh. Although this is automatically achieved by the
metalanguage, we may need this information for proving (posin x (F x)). This
is achieved by the hypothesis (notin z (mu F)). The judgement notin and the
dual isin (see Section A.1) are auxiliary judgements for occur-checking. Roughly,
(notin x A) holds iff x does not occur free in A; dually for isin.
Finally, each formula of the modal +-calculus is therefore represented by a pair
preformula-proof of its well-formedness:
Record wfo : Set := mkwfo [prp : o; cnd : (iswf prp)].
In order to establish that our formalization is faithful, we introduce the following
notation: for X=[x1 , ..., xn]/Var, let
5X =
def
x1 : var,...,xn:var, e12:
t(x1=x2), ..., en&1, n :
t(xn&1=xn)
oX =
def [t | 5X |&t:o t canonical]
wfoX =
def [t # oX | _d .5X |&d : (iswf t)].
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We can then define the encoding map =X : 8X  oX , as follows:
=X (x)=(Var x) =X (.#)=(Imp =X (.) =X ())
=X (c.)=(Not =X (.)) =X ([a] .)=(Box a =X (.))
=X ( ff )=ff =X (+x.)=(mu [x:var] =X, x(.)).
Lemma 5.1. For X/Var finite, for . # 8X , and for x # X:
1. |&posin(x, .)  _t .5X |&t : (posin x =X (.))
2. |&negin(x, .)  _t .5X |&t : (negin x =X (.)).
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the syntax of ..
Base case. The only interesting case is when .= y. If |& negin(x, y) holds, then
y is different from x. By definition of 5X , there is the assumption exy : t(x=y);
hence t=exy . On the other hand, suppose that t is such that 5X |&t :
(negin x (Var y)). Since (negin x (Var y)) reduces to t(x=y), t has to be
an assumption exy . Hence, x is different from y, so |&negin(x, y) holds.
Inductive case. The only interesting case is .=+y. Then, |&posin(x, +y)
 |&posin(x, ) (definition of posin)
 _t .5X, y |&t : (posin x =X, y()) (ind. hypothesis)
 _t$ .5X |&t$ : (y : var)t(x=y)&>(posin x =X, y())
 _t$ .5X |&t$ : (posin x (mu [y : var] =X, y()) (type conversion)
 _t$ .5X |&t$ : (posin x =X (+y)) (definition of =). K
Lemma 5.2. For X/Var finite, for . preformula:
. # 8X  _t .5X |&t : (iswf =X (.)).
Proof. By induction on the syntax of .. The only interesting case is .=+x.
Then, . # 8X iff  # 8X, x and |&posin(x, ) (by definition of iswf ). By the inductive
hypothesis and Lemma 5.1, this holds iff there exist t1 ,t2 such that
5X , x :var |&t1 : (iswf =X, x() and 5X, x |&t2 : (posin x =X, x()). Now, the
only assumptions of the form e : t(y=z) which can be really needed in t2 have
x in place of y and z # FV()"[x] (see the proof of Lemma 5.1), so we can drop
all the others. Moreover, all these assumptions can be derived from (notin x (mu
[x : var] =X, x())) (easily proved by induction on ). Hence,
5X , x : var, n : (notin x (mu [x : var] =X, x())) |&t2 : (posin x =X, x()).
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By abstracting t1 over n, and combining it with t2 , we obtain a term t$ such that
5X |&t$ : (x : var)(iswf =X, x())"
((notin x (mu [x : var] =X, x())) &> (posin x =X, x()))
The type of this term is convertible to (iswf =X (+x)); hence the thesis. K
The faithfulness of our formalization is therefore stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1. For X/Var finite, the map =X is a compositional bijection between
8X and wfoX .
Proof. Clearly, =X is injective and compositional. For . # 8X , by Lemma 5.2 the
type (iswf =X (.)) is inhabited, hence =X (.) # wfoX . Surjectivity can be proved by
defining the inverse map $X : wfoX  8X , as follows:
$X ((Var x))=x $X ((Imp A B))=$X (A)#$X (B)
$X ((Not A))=c$X (A) $X ((Box a A))=[a] $X (A)
$X (ff)= ff $X ((mu[x : var] A))=+x$X, x(.).
This map is well defined: each term in wfoX has a proof of its well-formedness, and
hence it correspond to a well-formed formula. It is easy to prove that for all
t # wfoX : =X ($X (t))=t (by induction on the syntax of t). K
5.2. Formalizing the Proof System N \+K
In the formalization paradigm of logical frameworks, a proof system is usually
represented by introducing a proving judgement over the set of formul$, such as
T : o &> Prop. A type (T phi) should be intended, therefore, as ‘‘. is true;’’ any
term which inhabits (T phi) is a witness (a proof) that . is true. Each rule is then
represented by a type constructor of T. Moreover, substitution schemata for bind-
ing operators need not to be implemented by hand, because they are inherited from
the metalanguage. This is the case, for instance, of ‘‘\’’ in first order Logic; for
further examples and discussion, we refer to [2, 8, 13].
However, in representing the proof system N \+K , several difficult issues arise.
These issues escape the standard formalization paradigm, so we have to accom-
modate some special technique. In the following subsections, we will describe in
detail these problems and the solutions we adopted.
5.2.1. Formalization of classical, least-fixed point and modal rules. The for-
malization of modal proof rules, such as Sc and +-E, requires special care.
Moreover, Scott’s rule is parametric in the number of assumptions which have to
be ‘‘boxed.’’ Actually, in the underlying theory of CIC there is no direct way for
enforcing on a premise the condition that it is a theorem (i.e., that it depends on
no assumptions) or, more generally, that a formula depends only on a given set of
assumptions. This is because the typing rules of PTS’s are strictly in natural deduc-
tion style. Therefore, in the presence of sequent-style rules such as Sc and +-E, one
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could encode a complete sequent calculus introducing the type olist of lists of
formul$, the sequent judgement Seq:olist&>o&>Prop , and all the machinery of
Gentzen’s original system [12]. This would lead to an unusable proof system: even
if our rules have a natural deduction flavour, all the goals would be crammed with
the list of hypotheses, and we should deal with supplementary structural rules for
manipulating the list of assumptions.
Instead, we represent more efficiently the assumption set by means of the proof
context provided by CIC, i.e., by taking advantage of the possibility of reasoning
‘‘under assumptions.’’ The solution we adopt exploits again the possibility provided
by logical frameworks of considering locally quantified premises, i.e., general
judgements in the terminology of MartinLo f. For a in-depth discussion on this
technique for the representation of modal logics, we refer to [3].
First, we represent [ and \ by means of two judgements bind:var&>o&>
Prop and expto:o&>o&>Prop , respectively. The former has no constructor (it is
declared as a Parameter), while the latter is rendered as an inductive predicate,
as expected. In particular, the congruence rule for + is rendered by means of a
locally quantified (new) variable (see Appendix A.2 for the whole listing):
Parameter bind : var &> o &> Prop.
(* structural closure of bind *)
Inductive expto : o &> o &> Prop :=
exptorflx : (phi:o)(expto phi phi)
| exptobtrns : (x:var)(phi,psi:o)
(bind x phi)&>(expto phi psi)&>(expto (Var x) psi)
(... other rules ...)
| exptomu : (phi,psi:var&>o)((x:var)(expto (phi x) (psi x)))&>
(expto (mu phi) (mu psi)).
Then, we introduce the basic proving judgement, T:U&>o&>Prop:
Paramete U : Set.
Parameter T : U &> o &> Prop.
where the type U (the universe) is an open (i.e., noninductive) set with no construc-
tor. Hence, the only terms which can inhabit U are variables, which will be called
worlds for suggestive reasons.3 Each pure rule (i.e., with no side condition), is
parameterized over a generic world, like the following:
Axiom ImpI : (w:U)(phi,psi:o)
((T w phi) &> (T w psi)) &> (T w (Imp phi psi)).
Therefore, in a given world all the classical rules apply as usual. It should be
noticed that these rules are schematic on generic preformul$ and not only on well
formed formul$. The reason of this will be discussed in Section 5.2.3; for the
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3 The reader aware of Kripke models can see here a clear connection with the semantics of modal
logics, as pointed out in [4]. However, we would stress that these variables can be seen just as a syntac-
tic device on their own, without bearing in mind any particular semantics. In fact, the technique can be
applied to any logic with similar rules, even if these logics do not have a Kripke-like model.
moment, we just point out that we require the phi in ImpE and NotE, and the
(mu F) in muE, to be wellformed, e.g. as follows:
Axiom ImpE : (phi,psi:o)(w:U)(iswf phi) &>
(T w (Imp phi psi)) &> (T w phi) &> (T w psi).
Proof rules, on the other hand, are distinguished by local quantifications of the
world parameter, in order to make explicit the dependency between a conclusion
and its premises. The rule +-E is represented as follows:
Axiom muE : (F:var&>o)(iswf (mu F)) &>
((z:var)(notin z (mu F)) &> (bind z A) &>
(w’:U)(T w’ (F z))&>(T w’ A))
&> (w:U)(T w (mu F)) &> (T w A).
The idea behind the use of the extra parameter is that in making an assumption,
we are forced to assume the existence of a world, say w, and to instantiate the
judgement T also on w. This judgement then appears as an hypothesis on w. Hence,
deriving as premise a judgement, which is universally quantified with respect to U,
amounts to establishing the judgement for the generic world w’ on which only the
given assumptions are made, i.e., on the given assumptions.
The formalization of +-E (and +-I) uses also the auxiliary judgement bind.
Following the idea of N \+K , the context .( } ) of +x.(x) is filled with a fresh (i.e.,
locally quantified) variable z. The binding between z and the corresponding
formula is kept in the derivation environment by the hypothesis (bind z A). Since
the typing rules of CIC automatically ensure that z is different from any other free
variable, the set of bindings in the environment still form a binding list. These
bindings can be used in the derivation of expansion judgements, for replacing
formul$ only when it is needed. For an example, see Appendix A.3.
The discharged hypothesis (notin z (mu F)) in rule muE reflects at the logical
level the fact that z is fresh. Although freshness of z obviously holds, it cannot be
inferred in the system because it belongs to the metalevel of the system. Hence, we reify
it by means of the discharged hypothesis, which may be needed in the rest of derivation
for inferring well-formedness of discharged formul$ in rules Raa, #-I, c-I.
5.2.2. Formalization of sequent-style rules. The idea presented in the previous
section can be suitably generalized to take care of an unlimited number of assump-
tions. A generic sequent .1 , ..., .n |&. is faithfully represented by the type (w:U)
(T w phi1)&>...&>(T w phin)&>(T w phi) where phi i==X (.i) and phi=
=X (.). The locally quantified world w forces any proof of (T w phi) to depend
only on the given assumptions. The problem is to capture the parametricity
expressed by the ‘‘ . . . ’’. At this end, we introduce the auxiliary set of lists of formuls
and the auxiliary function Sequent:U&>o&>olist&>Prop :
Inductive olist : Set := nil : olist | cons : o &> olist &> olist.
Fixpoint Sequent [w:U; phi:o; l:olist] : Prop :=
Cases l of
nil => (T w phi)
| (cons phii l’) => (T w phii) &> (Sequent w phi l’)
end.
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Therefore, the aforementioned representation of .1 , ..., .n |&. is denoted by
(w:U)(Sequent w phi G) where G is the list composed by phi1,...,phin . In
fact, (Sequent w phi G) is exactly ;@$-equivalent (that is, it reduces) to
(T w phi1)&>...&>(T w phin)&>(T w phi). Hence, Scott’s rule is represented
as follows:
Fixpoint Boxlist [a:Act; l:olist] : olist :=
Cases l o
nil => nil
| (cons psi l’) => (cons (Box a psi) (Boxlist a l’))
end.
Axiom Sc : (phi:o)(w:U)(G:olist)(a:Act)
((w’:U)(Sequent w’ phi G))
&> (Sequent w (Box a phi) (Boxlist a G)).
where the map Boxlist:Act&>olist&>olist represents exactly the ‘‘[a] 1 ’’
notation of rule Sc. Hence, in the application of rule Sc, we can use the conversion
tactics provided by Coq for automatically converting applications of Sequent to
the right proposition.
5.2.3. Dealing with non-well-formed formulq. Although it allows for a faithful
representation of the syntax, the use of 7-types is not harmless when we come to
the representation and usage of the proof system. In fact, a strict formalization of
the rules should consider only terms of type wfo, as follows
Axiom wImpE : (phi,psi:wfo)(w:U)
(T w (Imp (prp phi) (prp psi))) &> (T w (prp phi)) &>
(T w (prp psi)).
where prp:wfo&>o is the first projection defined on the 7-type wfo. This differs
from the rules we have presented in the previous sections, where we allow for deal-
ing with generic preformul$. Actually, the usage of a ‘‘well-formed formul$ only’’
formalization would be quite cumbersome and awkward, because at every rule
application we would be required to provide the proof of well-formedness of the
involved formul$. Hence we need a ‘‘light’’ version of N \+K , where the well-formed-
ness constraints are reduced to a minimum.
Let us call prederivations the derivations of N \+K where preformul$ also are
allowed. Of course, every derivation is also a prederivation, but there are many
prederivations of meaningless sequents, such as the following 6 : <; < |&+xcx
(c+xcx)1
6$
+xcx (c+xcx)1
c-E
ff
Raa
+xcx
(1),
where the derivation 6$: <; c+xcx |&+xcx is an instance of a subderivation of
.[+x.x]#+x. which appears in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Hence we need to add
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some well-formedness constraint, in order to restrict prederivations to only
derivations.
As far as the expansion system is concerned, we have the following result:
Proposition 5.1. Let 2 be a binding list containing only well-formed formuls,
and .,  preformuls such that 2 |&. \ . Then, . is well-formed iff  is well-formed.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 2 |&. \ . The case of reflexivity
rule is trivial. Congruence rules also are easy, the most complex case being that of
+. Suppose that 2 |&+x. \ +x ends with an application of the congruence rule
w.r.t. +. Then, +x. is well formed iff .[zx] is well formed and z appears only
positively in .[zx], iff [zx] is well formed (by the inductive hypothesis) and z
appears only positively in [zx] (easy to prove), iff +x. is well-formed.
Finally, suppose that 2 |&x \  ends with an application of the ‘‘variable
replacement rule.’’ Then, there is a binding x [ . in 2. By assumption, . is well-
formed, and hence by inductive hypothesis, also  is. K
On the other hand, for derivations of the logical system we introduce the follow-
ing notion of well-formedness:
Definition 5.1. The preformula . in rules #-E and c-E and the formula +x.
in rule +-E are called cut preformuls.
A prederivation 6 : 2; 1 |&. is well formed (wf-prederivation) if all preformul$ in
2, 1, . and all cut preformul$ are well formed.
Clearly, every derivation is a wf-prederivation. Also the converse holds:
Proposition 5.2. Every wf-prederivation is a derivation.
Proof. We have to prove that if 6: 2; 1 |&. is a wf-prederivation, then every
preformula in it is well formed. We proceed by induction on the depth of 6.
If 6 is an assumption, then . # 1 and hence it is well formed.
If the last rule of 6 : 2; 1 |&.# is #-I, then there is a prederivation
6: 2; 1, . |&, which is well formed because . and  are well formed. By inductive
hypothesis, 6$ is a derivation and hence 6 is also. Similarly if the last rule of 6
is c-I, Raa, Sc.
If the last rule of 6: 2; 1 |& is [rlref]#-E, then there are two prederivations
6$: 2; 1 |&. and 6": 2; 1 |&.#. Since . is a cut formula, then it is well formed
by the hypothesis that 6 is well formed. Thus, 6$ and 6" are wf-derivations and
hence, for inductive hypothesis, they are derivations. So also 6 is. Similarly if the
last rule of 6 is c-E.
If the last rule is \-L or \-R, then the thesis follows from Proposition 5.1.
If the last rule of 6: 2; 1 |& is +-E, then there are two prederivations
6$: 2; 1 |&+x. and 6": 2, z [ ; 1, .[zx] |&. Since +x. is a cut formula, then
it and .[zx] are well formed by the hypothesis that 6 is well formed. Thus, 6$
and 6" are wf-derivations and hence, for the inductive hypothesis, they are deriva-
tions. So is 6. Similarly if the last rule of 6 is +-I. K
This result allows us to adopt the relaxed formalization of N \+K we have discussed
in the previous sections: all the well formedness checks but those on cut formul$
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can be dropped, provided that the results we have to prove are stated only on well
formed formul$. For an example, see Appendix A.3.
5.2.4. Adequacy of the formalization. In order to state the adequacy of our
formalization with respect to N \+K , we introduce the following notation. Let X/Var
be finite, and .1 , ..., .n , . # 8X ; then, for x1 , ..., xn # X and for w:U, we define
$X (x1 [ .1 , ..., xn [ .n) =
def
b1 : (bind x1 =X (.1)),...bn : (bind xn =X (.n))
#X, w(.1 , ..., .n) =
def
h1 : (T w =X (.1)),...,hn : (T w =X (.n)).
Lemma 5.3. Let X/Var be finite and 2 a binding list such that FV(2)X.
Then, for all .1 , .2 # 8X : 2 |&.1 \ .2 if and only if there exists t canonical such
that 5X , $X (2) |&t : (expto =X (.1) =X (.2))
Proof. ( O ) By induction on the proof of 2 |&.1 \ .2 . Most cases are
trivial; let us consider the case when the last rule applied is the structural rule for
+. Then, .1=+x1 and .2=+x2 for some 1 , 2 , and 2 |&1[zx] \ 2[zx]
for z fresh. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a term t1 such that
5X, z , $X (2) |&t : (expto =X, z(1[zx]) =X, z(2[zx])).
By abstracting on z and applying exptomu, we obtain a term t$ such that
5X , $X (2) |&t$:(expto (mu [z:var] =X, z(1[zx]))
(mu [z:var] =X, z(2[zx])))
which is equivalent to 5X , $X (2) |&t$:(expto =X (.1) =X (.2)) by :-conversion and
definition of =X .
( o ) By induction on the syntax of term t, by cases on the head constructor.
Notice that the head constructor of t cannot be a Case. Suppose that t is
(Case A of ...); then A has to be a variable since t is canonical. But the only
variables are those in 5X , $X (2), and none of them belongs to a inductive
typeabsurd. Hence, each constructor of type expto always corresponds to a rule
of the expansion system; thus the proof can be readily recovered. K
Theorem 5.2. Let X/Var be finite, 2 a binding list such that FV(2)X, and
1/8X finite. Then, for all . # 8X : 2; 1 |&. if and only if there exists t canonical
such that 5X , $X (2), w:U, #X, w(1 ) |&t : (T w =X (.)).
Proof. ( O ) By induction on the proof of 2; 1 |&.. Here, we show briefly the
case for [rlref] +-E, the others being similar (or simpler).4
Let 2; 1 |&+x. and 2, z [ ; .[zx] |&. By the inductive hypothesis, there
exist two terms t1,t2 such that
5X , $X (2), w:U, #X, w(1 ) |&t1 : (T w [x : var] =X, x(.))
5X, x , $X (2), b : (bind x =X ()), w:U,h:(T w =X, x(.)) |&t2 : T w =X ()).
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4 See [3] for a full description of the adequacy of encodings based on the world technique.
By abstracting t2 over b, w, and x, we obtain a term t$2 such that
5X , $X (2) |&t$2 : (x : var)(bind x =X ())&>(w:U)(Tw =X, x(.))&>(T w =X ()).
Moreover, since +x. is well formed, by Lemma 5.2 there is a term t3 such that
5X |&t3 : (iswf =X (+x.)). We can thus build the required proof by applying the
constructor muE to t1 , t$2 , and t3 .
( o ) By induction on the syntax of t: each constructor of (T w phi)
corresponds to a rule of N \+K . We show the case of muI.
Let t be (muI F [z:var][b:(bind z (mu F))]t’) of type (T w (mu F)),
where (mu F) is =X (+x.). We have
5X, z , $X (2), b : (bind z (mu F)), w : U, #X, w(1 ) |&t$ : (T w (F z)),
where z is a fresh variable and (F z) is the encoding of .[zx]. Hence,
$X (2), b : (bind z (mu F)) is the encoding of the binding list 2, z [ +x.. By the
inductive hypothesis, there exists a proof 2, z [ +x.; 1 |&.; by applying the rule
+-I, we obtain 2; 1 |&+x..
As a consequence of this result, every proof which can be built on paper using
the system N \+K , can be readily mimicked step-by-step in the encoding of N
\
+K in
Coq, and vice versa. Hence, since N \+K is sound and complete for the propositional
+-calculus, then its encoding also is sound and complete.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a proof system N \+K for the propositional modal
+-calculus and its formalization in the calculus of inductive constructions. Beside
the formalization, N \+K is interesting on its own for several reasons: it is in the
natural deduction style, it has been proved complete with respect to logical conse-
quences (while traditional Hilbert-style proof systems are complete with respect to
theorems), and its usage should be easier than axiomatic proof systems. Moreover,
in N \+K substitutions of formul$ for variables are not always performed, but they
may be delayed until actually needed.
In the formalization, we have addressed several problematic issues. First, the use
of the higher order abstract syntax frees us from a tedious encoding of the
mechanisms involved in the handling of :-conversion, because it is automatically
inherited from the metalevel. Second, substitution is represented by an expansion
proof system, whose proofs are syntax-driven and can be highly automatized in the
Coq environment. Third, we have faithfully represented the context-sensitive
language of a modal +-calculus by formalizing the notion of a well formed formula.
Finally, the modal nature of impure rules of modal +-calculus (Sc and +-E) has
been effectively rendered, although logical frameworks do not support directly
modal rules.
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The techniques we have adopted can be readily ported to other formalisms
featuring similar problematic issues, such as the *-calculus, higher-order process
calculi, and languages defined by context-sensitive grammars.
Moreover, our experience in dealing also with the modal +-calculus confirmed
that logical frameworks allow us to encode faithfully the formal systems under
consideration, without imposing on the user of the proof editor the burden of
cumbersome translations into, say, first-order logic or monadic second-order logic.
However, nowadays proof editors and logical frameworks are still under develop-
ment; hence, they will benefit from extensive case studies and applications, such as
the one presented here, which can enlighten weak points and suggest further
improvements.
Related and future work. The representation of objectlogic variables by means
of metalevel variables of a generic set var without constructors has been used
before in [15] and exploited in [16] in the full formalization of the ?-calculus and
its metatheory. The implementation of substitution by means of an environment of
bindings has been previously investigated in the context of logic programming by
Miller [22] and in that of model checking by Stirling and Walker [28]. This fact
deserves further investigation. For instance, N \+K could be integrated with a model
checker in a simple and efficient way; the model checker could be implemented in
Coq, and its correctness formally verified. Previously, Yu and Luo formalized a
model checker for CCS and the +-calculus in LEGO [30]. Although in their encod-
ing, binding operators are represented by means of de Bruijn indexes, their
approach should be feasible also in the HOAS-based formalization presented in this
paper.
At the moment, great effort is being spent on the problem of combining higher-
order abstract syntax with inductive definitions. The aim is to allow for higher-
order constructors inside inductive definitions, together with adequate elimination
principles. Eventually, these improvements should lead to new logical frameworks,
adequately supporting both HOAS and recursioninduction. For further details on
recents developments in this area, we refer to [811, 14].
From a proof-theoretical point of view, rule Sc is not satisfactory, since it breaks
the typical introductionelimination pattern of Natural Deduction systems. A pure
natural deduction-style proof system for the propositional +-calculus (i.e., without
the modal constructor ‘‘[a] .’’) has been investigated in [29]. Whether there is a
truly natural deduction formulation of the modal +-calculus remains an open
question. A promising approach to the development of a system suitable for proof-
theoretical results is to reflect in the system a semantic notion, such as the
transition relation of the underlying model. This approach has been successfully
adopted by Simpson in the construction of strong normalizing natural deduction-
style proof systems for modal logics [26].
Another future work stemming from this research is the development of a user
friendly, mouse-oriented environment which adopts our Coq formalization as a
proof kernel. In such an environment, the user could carry out interactively formal
verifications based on the modal +-calculus.
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APPENDIX: Coq CODE
This code is also available at http:www.dimi.uniud.ittmiculan
mucalculus.
A.1. Code of the Formalization of the Syntax
(* Sets for actions, variables *)
Parameter Act, var : Set.
(* var is at least enumerable *)
Axiom varnat : (Ex [srj:var&>nat](n:nat)(Ex [x:var](srj x)=n)).
Lemma neverempty : (x:var)(Ex [y:var] t(x=y)).
(* proof omitted *)
(* the set of preformulae, also not well formed *)
Inductive o : Set := ff : o
| Not : o &> o
| Imp : o &> o &> o
| Box : Act &> o &> o
| Var : var &> o
| mu : (var&>o) &>o .
Fixpoint isin [x:var;phi:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases phi of
ff => False
| (Not psi) => (isin x psi)
| (Imp phi1 phi2) => (isin x phi1)"(isin x phi2)
| (Box a psi) => (isin x psi)
| (Var y) => x=y
| (mu F) => (y:var)(isin x (F y))
end.
Fixpoint notin [x:var;phi:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases phi of
ff => True
| (Not psi) => (notin x psi)
| (Imp phi1 phi2) => (notin x phi1)"(notin x phi2)
| (Box a psi) => (notin x psi)
| (Var y) => t(x=y)
| (mu F) => (y:var) t(x=y)&>(notin x (F y))
end.
Fixpoint posin [x:var;phi:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases phi of
ff => True
| (Not psi) => (negin x psi)
| (Imp phi1 phi2) => (negin x phi1)"(posin x phi2)
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| (Box a psi) => (posin x psi)
| (Var y) => True
| (mu F) => (y:var) t(x=y)&>(posin x (F y))
end
with negin [x:var;phi:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases phi of
ff => True
| (Not psi) => (posin x psi)
| (Imp phi1 phi2) => (posin x phi1)"(negin x phi2)
| (Box a psi) => (negin x psi)
| (Var y) => t(x=y)
| (mu F) => (y:var) t(x=y)&>(negin x (F y))
end.
Fixpoint iswf [phi:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases phi of
ff => True
| (Not psi) => (iswf psi)
| (Imp phi1 phi2) => (iswf phi1)"(iswf phi2)
| (Box a psi) => (iswf psi)
| (Var y) => True
| (mu F) => (x:var)(iswf (F x))"
((notin x (mu F)) &> (posin x (F x)))
end.
(* the set of well formed formuale *)
Record wfo : Set := mkwfo [prp : o;
cnd : (iswf prp)].
(* separation: if x does not appear in phi and y do, then x and y
* are not the same identifiers & proof omitted *)
Lemma separation : (x,y:var)(phi:o)
(notin x phi) &> (isin y phi) &> t(x=y).
Lemma notinposinnegin :
(x:var)(phi:o)(notin x phi) &> (posin x phi)"(negin x phi).
Lemma notinposin : (x:var)(phi:o)(notin x phi) &> (posin x phi).
Lemma notinnegin : (x:var)(phi:o)(notin x phi) &> (negin x phi).
A.2. Code of the Formalization of the Proof System
(* the binding judgement *)
Parameter bind : var &> o &> Prop.
(* expansion precongruence *)
Section Expansion.
Inductive expto : o &> o &> Prop :=
exptorflx : (phi:o)(expto phi phi)
| exptobtrns : (x:var)(phi,psi:o)
(bind x phi)&>(expto phi psi)&>(expto (Var x) psi)
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| exptoNot : (phi,psi:o)
(expto phi psi) &> (expto (Not phi) (Not psi))
| exptoImp : (phi1,phi2,psi1,psi2:o)
(expto phi1 psi1)&>(expto phi2 psi2)
&>(expto (Imp phi1 phi2) (Imp psi1 psi2))
| exptoBox : (phi,psi:o)(expto phi psi)&>
(a:Act)(expto (Box a phi) (Box a psi))
| exptomu : (phi,psi:var&>o)((x:var)(expto (phi x) (psi x))) &>
(expto (mu phi) (mu psi)).
Hints Immediate exptobind exptorflx exptobtrns
exptoNot exptoImp exptoBox exptomu : core.
Lemma exptobind : (x:var)(phi:o)(bind x phi)&>(expto (Var x) phi).
Lemma exptotrns : (phi,psi:o)(expto phi psi) &>
(xi:o)(expto psi xi) &>(expto phi xi).
(* proofs omitted *)
End Expansion.
(* lists of formulae for Scott rule *)
Inductive olist : Set :=
nil : olist
| cons : o &> olist &> olist.
(* Boxlist represents the [a]"Gamma notation *)
Fixpoint Boxlist [a:Act; l:olist] : olist :=
Cases l of
nil => nil
| (cons psi l’) => (cons (Box a psi) (Boxlist a l’))
end.
(* the universe, for the world technique *)
Parameter U : Set.
(* the proving judgement *)
Parameter T : U &> o &> rop.
(* (Sequent w phi (phi1...phin)) corresponds to phi1,...phin |& phi *)
Fixpoint Sequent [w : U; phi:o; l:olist] : Prop :=
Cases l of
nil => (T w phi)
| (cons phii l’) => (T w phii) &> (Sequent w phi l’)
end.
Section ProofRules.
Variable phi,psi,xi:o.
Variable w:U.
Axiom NotI : ((T w phi) &> (T w ff)) &> (T w (Not phi)).
Axiom NotE : (iswf phi) &> (T w phi)&>(T w (Not phi)) &> (T w ff).
Axiom RAA : ((T w (Not phi)) &> (T w ff)) &> (T w phi).
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Axiom ImpI : ((T w phi) &> (T w psi)) &> (T w (Imp phi psi)).
Axiom ImpE : (iswf phi) &>
(T w (Imp phi psi)) &> (T w phi) &> (T w psi).
Axiom Sc : (G:olist)(a:Act)
((w’:U)(Sequent w’ phi G))
&>(Sequent w (Box a phi) (Boxlist a G)).
Axiom exptoR : (expto phi psi) &> (T w phi) &> (T w psi).
Axiom exptoL : (expto phi psi) &> (T w psi) &> (T w phi).
Axiom muI : (F:var&>o)((z:var)(bind z (mu F)) &> (T w (F z)))
: &> (T w (mu F)).
Axiom muE : (F:var&>o)(iswf (mu F)) &>
((z:var)(notin z (mu F)) &> (bind z phi) &>
(w’:U)(T w’ (F z))&>(T w’ phi))
&>(T w (mu F)) &> (T w phi).
(* some derived rules & proofs omitted *)
Lemma ffE : (T w ff) &> (T w phi).
Lemma K : (a:Act)((w’:U)(T w’ psi) &> (T w’ phi))
&> (T w (Box a psi)) &> (T w (Box a phi)).
End ProofRules.
A.3. An Example Session in Coq
We will show a complete Coq session, in which we prove that both <; . |&+x
(c.#x) and <; +x(c.#x) |&.. These proofs are an example of how one would
proceed in working with the encoding, interleaving logical steps with proofs of well-
formedness and expansions as needed. Commands entered by the user are written
in this font.
miculancoltrane: t> coqtop
Welcome to Coq V6.3.1 (December 1999)
Coq < Require mu.
[Reinterning mu ...done]
(* An example *)
Lemma ex1 : (phi:wfo)(w:U)
(T w (prp phi)) <&>
(T w (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x)))).
ex1 < (Intros;Split;Intro).
(* first direction: &> *)
ex1 < Apply muI; Intros; Apply ImpI; Intro.
(* now the goal is
phi : wfo
w : U
H : (T w (prp phi))
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z : var
H0 : (bind z (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
H1 : (T w (Not (prp phi)))
============================
(T w (Var z))
we replace z with the corresponding term:
*)
ex1 < Apply exptoL with (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x)));
Auto.
(*
phi : wfo
w : U
H : (T w (prp phi))
z : var
H0 : (bind z (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
H1 : (T w (Not (prp phi)))
============================
(expto (Var z) (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
*)
ex1 < Apply exptobind; Assumption.
(*
phi : wfo
w : U
H : (T w (prp phi))
z : var
H0 : (bind z (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
H1 : (T w (Not (prp phi)))
============================
(T w (mu [x:var](Imp Not prp hi)) Var ))))
*)
ex1 < Apply ffE; Apply NatE with phi :=(prp phi).
(* this generates three goals:
phi : wfo
w : U
H : (T w (prp phi))
z : var
H0 : (bind z (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
H1 : (T w (Not (prp phi)))
============================
(iswf (prp phi))
subgoal 2 is:
(T w (prp phi))
subgoal 3 is:
(T w (Not (prp phi)))
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they are immediate:
*)
ex1 < Exact (cnd phi). Assumption. Assumption.
(* second direction <& : the goal is as follows:
phi : wfo
w : U
H : (T w (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
============================
(T w (prp phi))
*)
ex1 < Apply muE with [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x));
[Simpl; Intros; Split | Intros | Assumption].
ex1 < Split; [Exact (cnd phi) | Trivial].
(* Now we face a huge and painful term & but don’t worry *)
ex1 < Intro; Split; Auto;
Apply notinposin; Elim (neverempty x); Intros;
Apply proj1 with B :=(not (eq ? x x0)); Apply H0; Assumption.
(* the goal does not depend on w and assumption H any more:
phi : wfo
w : U
H : (T w (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
z : var
H0 : (notin z (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
H1 : (bind z (prp phi))
w’ : U
H2 : (T w’ (Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var z)))
============================
(T w’ (prp phi))
so we can drop them *)
ex1 < Clear H w.
(* now we have completely changed the sequent:
phi : wfo
z : var
H0 :(notin z (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
H1 : (bind z (prp phi))
w’ : U
H2 : (T w’ (Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var z)))
============================
(T w’ (prp phi))
*)
ex1 < Apply RAA; Intros; Apply NotE with phi :=(prp phi);
[Exact (cnd phi) | Idtac | Assumption].
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(*
phi : wfo
z : var
H0 : (notin z (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
H1 : (bind z (prp phi))
w’ : U
H2 : (T w’ (Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var z)))
H : (T w’ (Not (prp phi)))
============================
(T w’ (prp phi))
Now we replace phi with z, in order to apply H1 *)
ex1 < Apply exptoR with (Var z).
(* the first goal is an expansion *)
ex1 < Apply exptobind; Assumption.
(* the second is
phi : wfo
z : var
H0 : (notin z (mu [x:var](Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var x))))
H1 : (bind z (prp phi))
w’ : U
H2 : (T w’ (Imp (Not (prp phi)) (Var z)))
H : (T w’ (Not (prp phi)))
============================
(T w’ (Var z))
which follows from H2
*)
ex1 < Apply ImpE with phi :=(Not (prp phi)); Try Assumption.
ex1 < Exact (cnd phi).
ex1 < Qed.
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